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The conflicts in the CAR were largely ignored by the international community until 2013. International interest rose with the presidential coup by Michél Djoto-
dia, the first Muslim president of the CAR, who later resigned in January 2014. As the violence in the country escalated, it was mainly portrayed as a conflict 
fuelled by religion between Muslim militia, Christian defence units and civilians. This paper focuses on this conflict and contextualises it within a trajectory of 
conflict. It argues that the conflict has other facets apart from a religious strife, and includes ethnic and political factions and conflict as well. Through a case 
study method a narrative of events is provided and processes, groups and identities are analysed. The data were retrieved from United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) briefing notes and news series, and cover the period from 2000 to 2014. The results show that apart from a long-standing con-
flict related to changes in political leadership, there are other paths of violence, which are representative of other ethnic and political identities. The violence, 
which is currently defined as sectarian religious conflict is actually related to the contestation of political leadership, and the exploitation of different conflicts 
and groups for purposes of power.
1. Trajectories of Conflict in the CAR
Since independence in 1960, the CAR has experienced 
violent conflicts. These were embedded and resulted from 
competitors attempting to usurp or maintain political 
leadership and power, and the constant scourge of rebel 
armies, militias, armed youths, bandits, and civilian crimi-
nality. This led on to the persistent weakening of state insti-
tutions, including democratic social and political 
structures, as well as a faltering economy that cannot incor-
porate the majority of the population. CAR thus experi-
ences violence, extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary 
arrest and detention, and rampant state corruption. In 
addition, multiple actors – non-state actors as well as gov-
ernment – are involved in violence, and conflicts between 
state and non-state actors have been a defining feature. As 
such, CAR exemplifies very well what Gerlach (2010) has 
defined as an ‘extremely violent society’.
The 2013–2014 conflict is often understood as a religious 
confrontation pitting government troops against militias 
that eventually spilt over into civil and community con-
frontations. However, a characterisation of the conflict as 
Islam versus Christianity, government troops versus para-
militaries, and militias versus civilians fails to capture the 
true scope, parties and factions of the conflict.
CAR has experienced four violent changes in political 
leadership across the past decades, most of which have 
been the result of coups. Ange-Félix Patasse was elected 
democratically in 1993 a development in CAR politics 
moving away from coups such as that in 1981 by General 
André-Dieudonné Kolingba, against the first president of 
CAR, David Dacko. Unfortunately Patasse was then ousted 
by François Bozizé in 2003. Bozizé in turn was ousted by 
Michel Djotodia who proclaimed himself president in 
2013. Current president Faustin Touadera was elected 
democratically, after the caretaker interim government of 
Catherine Samba-Panza, although his rival Anicet Dolo-
guele claimed there were irregularities. Apart from the 
democratically elected Patasse, the CAR has continually 
experienced violent political transition with the use of the 
military or militias; this violent confrontation with state 
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forces has increased since 2000. During this period an 
increasing number of militias can be observed in the vari-
ous prefectures,1 established by government and non-
government forces, and in partnership or conflict with 
government forces, other militias or civilians.
This paper aims to demonstrate that there are two strands 
of violence and violent conflict in CAR. The first is the 
long-standing pattern that brings about change in political 
leadership by force in the form of coups. The second form, a 
corollary to the first, is a new and different path of violence 
that involves different types of non-state actors: civilians, 
defence units, and militias. This paper analyses the conflict 
and its dynamics between different types of actors, and 
explores the coalitions between these, and their regional dis-
tribution for different periods and in different prefectures.
Within the broad conceptual framework of extremely viol-
ent societies a descriptive case study method is used. The 
primary data source is United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) titled as news stories and briefing 
notes between 2000 and 2014. A total of one hundred 
documents were analysed. As a corpus, they provide a 
detailed and differentiated picture of the changing situ-
ation and violent activities in the CAR. The narrative fol-
lows the patterns according to which conflict and violence 
occurred over the four presidential terms. Each president’s 
term features an escalation of violence, claims to political 
legitimacy and power, changing relationships between 
leaders, armies and militias, and ensuing conflicts after 
they are ousted. The movement of internally displaced 
people (IDPs) and refugees, as documented in the UNHCR 
reports and briefings reveals the trajectory of government 
troops, militias, and bandits attacking particular areas. 
These paths of persistent violence and attacks create an 
environment of fear, hopelessness, and desperation that 
elevates tensions within and between village and urban 
communities. The research reveals that the recent violence 
in the CAR is both a continuation of earlier patterns of 
violence and behaviours, coupled with a new dimension 
from September 2013. The article will first describe the 
fluid landscape of ethnic and religious groups, and then 
move on to the various state and non-state actors involved 
in the conflict and violence.
2. Data and Methods
This article offers a qualitative case study of a conflict that 
is still ongoing. Current information is largely limited to 
websites and news media, which are subject to bias and dis-
tortion. The main data source used here is a set of United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
reports referred to as news stories and briefing notes cover-
ing the CAR during the period from 2000 to 2014. In line 
with its remit, the UNHCR reports are mainly about refu-
gees and victims, but also cover perpetrators of violence. 
They provide a consistent, differentiated, and competent 
account of relevant events during the period. The reports 
often focus on a single event, for example an attack on a 
particular area or community: the armed groups involved, 
the violence perpetrated against civilians, and the move-
ment of civilians, or entire communities, from the site of 
violence to areas perceived as safer or to refugee camps. 
Other reports place these events in a larger trend or time-
line of increasing or subsiding conflict and violence. Often, 
accounts of violence are based on victims’ reports, but the 
number of displaced individuals is tallied by the UNHCR. 
This provides a twofold narrative from the briefing notes. 
Firstly, the accounts of particular events are related by 
those who witnessed, experienced, or fled the violence, and 
secondly the UNCHR estimates give an impression of the 
intensity of the violence. Each report provides an event, a 
place, and an outcome and often, although not always, the 
number of people displaced, supported by maps. The 
reports describe antagonists in struggles for political 
leadership, political change, violence, conflict, displaced 
populations, refugee sites, and armed forces.
Reports were extracted for the period January 2000 to 
December 2014; up to seven briefing notes and news 
stories were selected for each year, for a combined total of 
1 A prefecture is an area under the administrative 
jurisdiction of a governor or appointed prefect 
(Adrien-Rongier 1981).
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one hundred. The potential limitations of this data should 
be noted: the UNHCR, like other organisations working 
with refugees, may elevate numbers of refugees in order to 
create a greater sense of urgency (Rice 2009, 27). However, 
specific numbers of refugees are of minor importance for 
the arguments made in this paper.
The UNHCR news stories and briefing notes also reveal the 
tensions that arise between ethnic groups within the refu-
gee sites in the form of verbal conflicts and demands for 
exclusion and expulsion of particular groups, often mirror-
ing events outside. Within the refugee camps this results in 
populations separating along ethnic and religious identities.
The period under discussion, 2000 to 2014, includes four 
presidencies, namely those of Patassé, Bozizé, Djotodia, and 
Samba-Panza. Patassé, the fifth president of CAR from 
1993 to 2003, was the first democratically elected president 
since independence in 1960.2 His second term in 2000 was 
marred by revolts that led to further conflict within the 
various prefectures.3 This period marked the beginning of 
accelerated violence in the CAR. Links to political and 
armed forces in neighbouring states exacerbated internal 
conflict led to increasing numbers of internally displaced 
people (IDPs) as well as refugees entering CAR from 
neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Sudan, and Chad (Vinck and Pham 2010). The UNHCR 
briefing notes and the news stories can thus be seen as a 
narration of trajectories of violence that include various 
actors with differing motivations, coalescing and parting 
again. The article is generally based on these one hundred 
documents.4
3. Identity, Religion, and Violence in the CAR
State formation and state-building remain complex in 
Africa due to persistent economic, political, and security 
fragility (Francis 2005). This can be partly attributed to the 
legacy of European colonialism, expansion, and resource 
extraction. These states, with borders determined by colo-
nial administrators, were vulnerable from a security per-
spective. Many, including the CAR, were weak to begin with 
and descended into violence soon after independence. 
Political authority in Africa has mutated into an institution 
of personal power rather than institutional leadership. As 
leaders use ethnic and religious affiliations, in the form of 
client relationships, to maintain political power, this process 
has undermined the potential for nation-building and 
patriotism. The state has become the means by which 
political elites in Africa have for decades enriched them-
selves by prioritising their personal interests over the needs 
of the people and development. According to the Index of 
State Fragility the CAR is a fragile state, like numerous 
other states in Africa. Due to internal and external factors a 
series of governments have been unable (or unwilling) to 
protect all civilians. Instead there has been a retreat to using 
and manipulating identities to maintain positions of power.
In the African context, conflicts often begin at higher levels 
between elites and subsequently trickle down into the 
population. The political environment is conducive to use 
of violent means to gain and maintain access to political 
power. Where armed groups are incorporated into political 
processes, conflicts are transferred from the political sphere 
to the civilian environment and communities, where they 
are easily (re)interpreted as ethnic or religious identity con-
cerns. Individuals and groups may show loyalty to a par-
ticular identity – ethnic, national, or religious – not because 
they were born into it but because there is an assumption 
of benefit associated with it (Eriksen 1996).
Conflicts begin when there are perceptions of exclusion, 
marginalisation, and preferential treatment of certain indi-
viduals and groups. Civilians receive information from 
government sources or militias that certain groups are 
being favoured or targeted. As identities are embedded in 
ethnicity, religion, or tribal allegiances people are easily 
2 Patassé became the first democratically elected 
president in 1993 as a result of international donor 
influence on the need for elections to the govern-
ment of General André-Dieudonné Kolingba. Kol-
ingba seized the presidency in a coup against David 
Dacko in 1981 and served until 1993.
3 Patassé’s leadership was plagued by conflicts, 
revolts, and failed coups. He was eventually ousted 
in 2003.
4 The news stories and briefing notes are available 
at www.unhcr.org.
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convinced that their group is being exploited, excluded, tar-
geted, or condemned. These sentiments have political and 
social consequences that in their extreme form can result 
in ethnic cleansing and expulsion (for ethnic cleansing in 
general, see Mann 2005). Yet others such as Stalyvas (2006) 
and Collier (1999) argue that these identities and social, 
ethnic, and religious divisions are not the sole reason for 
conflict; instead they need to be contextualised in broader 
economic and political developments. Ethnic groups can be 
defined as sharing common descent, history, culture, lan-
guage, religion, or territory (Mann 2005) and experience. 
These groups, although embracing cultural, religious and 
behavioural traits, are defined by outsiders as possessing an 
inherited status and aligned to certain rituals and mythol-
ogies. They thus create boundaries between groups and 
within communities (Cohen 1985). Hale (2008) argues that 
this creates an emotional connection between group 
members that is conducive to the use of violence against 
members of the outgroup and even against those within 
the group who are seen as traitors to the in-group and its 
identity (for example by marrying a partner from the out-
group). Leaders then use these sentiments to evoke images 
of unity and blood connections to incite hostilities towards 
the outgroup and the ‘Others’ (Hughey 1998).
History demonstrates that it requires little effort for these 
sentiments to be translated into issues of self-defence, pres-
ervation, and opportunism (Weber 1998). Using these 
sentiments and traits of identity, ordinary civilians are 
capable of engaging in collective violence – in particular if 
such behaviour is supported by institutions, and thus seen 
as legitimate. Often this behaviour is interpreted as self-
defence and, ironically, it is often the perpetrators that con-
sider themselves the victims (Staub 1989). Alternatively, 
ethnic tensions may lead perpetrators to consider their 
violence a necessary pre-emptive attack, as they perceive, or 
are led to believe, that their lives are inevitably in danger 
(Mann 2005).
Like ethnic violence, religious violence stems from per-
ceptions and interpretations of humiliation and exclusion, 
according to general studies on discrimination and viol-
ence. While these humiliations can be real, in the form of 
discrimination, poverty, and exclusion, it can also be ideo-
logical and a mere perception (Jones 2008, 39–40). These 
feelings of humiliation provide the psychological moti-
vation, but not the justification, for a radical polarity of 
good and evil, and finally for violence. Ethnic and religious 
identities are then perpetuated through the violent process, 
and seen as fixed and incommutable. The ethnic and relig-
ious framework thus forms an “ethical” framework and 
purpose for the militias, government troops, and armed 
civilians.
However, general scholarship about solidifying ethnic or 
religious identities causing violence applies with some 
qualification in the case of the CAR. Ethnic groups in the 
CAR are fluid and change due to social and economic cir-
cumstances (O’Toole 1986). In 1952 the French colonial 
authorities defined eight distinct ethnic groups based on 
administrative perceptions of differences and similarities. 
Later studies recognised thirty-one distinct ethnic groups 
(Lumba, Van Dyk, and Van Dyk 2009, 86). These included 
the Gbaya Manja (or Manza), Banda (many of whom con-
verted to Islam under the sultanate of Dar al-Kuti), Uban-
gians (a riverine population living between the Kemo and 
Mbomu rivers), Sara (and co-ethnic NzaKara originally 
from south-western Sudan), Zande, and Muslims (a group 
of traders that are not an ethnic but a religious group and 
popularly termed Hausa), as well as Cameroonian refugee 
groups in the northwest mountains (O’Toole 1986, 75; 
Kalck 1971, 11). The main groups are divided further; for 
example the Ubangians are comprised of Mbaka and 
Yakoma. Both O’Toole (1986) and Falck (1971) note that 
while the Muslim minority represented a distinct group, 
the other ethnic groups did not distinguish themselves 
according to religion. The form of Christianity was 
enmeshed with traditional beliefs and many, even today, 
continue to adhere to animist faiths (distinguishable by tal-
ismans and amulets).5 The society was and remains based 
on kinship and lineage relationships and this social pattern 
is exploited by the political regime.
5 For extensive, although dated, histories of the 
CAR, see O’Toole 1986 and Kalcke 1971.
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While ethnic groups remain distinct with underlying ten-
sions, the CAR has not had a lengthy history of ethnic con-
flict, and almost no religious conflict, even as it has faced 
continuous economic difficulties, deprivation, and 
marauding banditry in the rural areas. Since 2002 much of 
the conflicts and violence has been popularly attributed to 
competing political elites rather than to strife between 
communities of different ethnic identities (Vinck and 
Pham 2010, 13). As Lumba, Van Dyk, and Van Dyk (2009, 
87) note in their study, the general opinion amongst 
respondents was that ethnicity had been abused by “outside 
groups” and this was amongst the causes of the continuous 
conflicts in the region. Groups with diverse interests – like 
the coalitions described below – joined together to target 
others (for example Muslims) leading to assaults, murders, 
and expulsion of individuals and groups, as occurred dur-
ing the period 2013 to 2014 (see Cohen 1985 and Gerlach 
2010).
4. Conflict Landscapes in the CAR: State and Non-state Actors
In the complex political, ethnic and religious environment 
of CAR, the 2013 to 2014 conflict defies simple and dicho-
tomous portrayals of ethnic and religious strife. For 
example, attacks against Muslims, who are assumed to be 
Séléka supporters, are seen as a defence, and not an attack, 
by “Christian” civilian defence units known as the anti-
Balaka, thus creating a good versus evil scenario, bad Mus-
lim Séléka versus good Christian anti-Balaka. Such 
perceptions severely underrate the nature, role and activ-
ities of militias and armed groups in the conflicts.
Militias are non-state military actors. They are thus not 
part of – or only loosely connected to – the conventional 
armies and security forces of a state, but may be part of a 
rebel military organisation. In Africa they are overwhel-
mingly formations of armed men and youth who are 
linked either to the regime or to militias. Militias operate 
outside of the military and security forces of the state, but 
they are often created and led by senior government offi-
cials, and receive weapons, training and other support from 
the regular army. Although militias operate outside institu-
tional frameworks they can cross over into the legitimate 
political environment, become auxiliaries to political 
parties, and usurp political leadership. Created in the rural 
areas, militias are often, although not always, based in a 
dominant ethnic or religious group; their rank-and-file 
members consist of ex-soldiers, mercenaries, bandits, and 
unemployed youth. These groups form and disintegrate 
quickly, seeking access to material gains first in the locality 
where they monopolise violence (from which they often 
originate) (Alden, Thakur, and Arnold 2011; Gerlach 2010). 
While the interests of militias vary, one of the elements 
they seek to protect is often a particular ethnic or religious 
identity. This allows the militia to assert ideological control 
over a region to the exclusion of competitors such as loyal-
ists and government troops.
When governments are dominated by a single ethnic group 
whose interests they promote, they may purposely exclude 
other groups from accessing state institutions. In countries 
where economies are state monopolies, and access to 
employment and economic opportunities are limited, usur-
ping control of the state becomes a goal, or “the” goal 
(Mann 2005, 31–32). This is an environment that is con-
ducive to conflict over scarce resources and power, and 
encourages the formation and use of militias; with multiple 
groups and actors such conflicts become particularly viol-
ent, and involve all types of violence, against state institu-
tions, against state employees, and eventually against 
civilians.
In the course of the conflicts and political turmoil, CAR 
has been a fertile ground for the development of a number 
of militias and armed groups, and various more or less 
fragile coalitions among these. The Séléka is a coalition of 
the largest militias in CAR: the Convention des Patriotes 
pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP), the Convention Patrio-
tique pour le Salut wa Kodro (CPSK), the Union des Forces 
Démocratiques pour la Rassemblement (UFDR) and the 
Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC). 
Each of these armed groups controlled parts of particular 
prefectures, and the coalition formed in December 2013 
exercised virtually complete control of the northern and 
eastern prefectures. The fragility of these relationships and 
the instability of the militias is illustrated by the defection 
of segments of the CPJP militia to support the government 
forces. These armed groups in the CAR exhibit loose social 
affiliations and shared ethnic, religious and regional iden-
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tities. The origins of the anti-Balaka armed group are like 
those of any militia. It is reported that it was created by 
Bozizé, but its origins most likely lie in the 1990s as a self-
defence group responding to attacks by both bandits from 
the north of CAR and the Armée pour la Restauration de la 
République et al Démocratie (APRD). In addition, they 
sought to expel Chadian cattle farmers from lands belong-
ing to villagers (Layama and Nzapalainga 2014, 8). It is 
argued that many former soldiers and ex presidential 
guards joined the anti-Balaka in order to regain their pre-
vious civil employment. Like the Séléka, the anti-Balaka 
became, and remains, a coalition of interest groups. These 
associations are more about convenience and pursuing a 
particular aim than acknowledging conscious identity: for 
the leaders of these groups there appears to be no ideology 
other than material gain and access to political power. The 
Séléka militia faced little resistance from government forces 
as it moved toward the capital, Bangui, in 2013.
This advance was halted by the Libreville peace agreement 
in 2013, in which it was agreed to allow President Bozizé to 
serve until 2016. However the agreement collapsed in what 
the opposition perceived as the government’s deliberate 
foot-dragging and reneging on agreements. Members of 
the Séléka rebelled and continued to fight, as they opposed 
the peace agreement. There was no religious or ethnic 
component to the conflict at this stage. When Séléka 
entered Bangui and President Djotodia resigned, the militia 
broke up into Séléka and anti-Séléka; the latter proceeded 
to attack civilians and turned against Séléka forces in the 
capital.
This led to revenge attacks by communities and individuals 
on the basis of religion. From March 2013 Djotodia was 
portrayed as a Muslim and the militia was given a religious 
identity. Anti-Séléka attacks on civilians created a narrative 
that Muslims were targeting innocent Christian civilians. 
Christians, characterised in positive terms, were portrayed 
as having had little choice but to react. However, attacks 
took place against all civilians, Muslims, Christians, and 
animists alike. Misreading, and therefore misunderstanding 
the conflict in the CAR mainly as motivated and driven by 
religion fails to recognise the complex pattern of tempor-
ary coalitions that emerge and disappear under different 
leaderships, and then coalesce against a perceived new 
enemy or enemies – usually the existing government 
(Rubin 2006, 17). The formation and division of the Séléka 
are exemplary for these developments.
In the ensuing violence, often including mass violence, 
communities become participants (active or passive) in 
ways that often destroy social bonds (Mudge 2013). The 
hostilities between armed groups, including regular gov-
ernment forces, armed militias, bandit groups, and civilians 
remain haphazard (Rice 2009, 27; see also Gerlach 2010; 
Kalyvas 2006; Hale 2008; UNHCR 2006b, 2009e; UNICEF 
2009), as is the behaviour of militias and forces loyal to the 
government. These groups recruit from the localities and 
regions where they operate, and use ethnic identity to 
identify and recruit potential followers. As violence esca-
lated in this conflict it becomes easier to recruit along relig-
ious, cultural and ethnic identities. As a result it became 
easier to create dichotomy in recruitment and identify 
individuals and groups as either Christian or Muslim.
5. Identity, Power Politics, and Trajectories of Violence.
The CAR possesses large reserves of natural resources and 
its ongoing political instability accompanied by weak state 
institutions and controls make the territory a prospect for 
entities seeking economic gain, including existing elites, 
competing armed groups, and external interests (Flichy de 
la Neuville, Mezin-Bourgninand, and Mathias 2013). Eth-
nic identities, like religious identities, are used in these con-
flicts to serve political interests and increase material gains, 
rather than triggering them. The UNHCR documents 
reveal a fragmented country experiencing a multi-polar 
conflict (Gerlach 2010). Patterns of escalating violence 
emerge, both in the rural and urban areas (UNHCR 2001d, 
2002a, 2002c). The data also reveals a consistent pattern of 
coerced emigration and displacement (UNHCR 2002b, 
2005a, 2005b, 2005e, 2005f, 2006d, 2006e). Patterns of riot-
ing, looting, rape, assault, property destruction and murder 
occurred throughout the period under discussion 
(UNHCR 2007c, 2007g, 2008a, 2009e). The outbreak of 
violence, which resulted from the failed 2012 peace treaty 
with former president Bozizé, added another dimension. 
Since 2013 the escalation of violence and forced emigration 
has been aggravated by foreign government troops from 
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the neighbouring countries of Chad, Libya, and Sudan 
(UNHCR 2006f, 2008c, 2010a).
5.1. Identity Politics and Trajectories of Violence
The first trajectory of violence began in 2001 when politi-
cal strife between André-Dieudonné Kolingba (from the 
Yakoma ethnic group) and Ange-Félix Patassé (Sara-Kaba 
group) resulted in unsuccessful coup attempts in 2001 and 
2002.6 In the aftermath of these failed coups government 
troops used excessive force against civilians, particularly 
villagers, accusing them of supporting Kolingba or Patassé 
or because they shared ethnic identity with either individ-
ual. In 2001, in the south of Bangui, 60,000 to 70,000 civil-
ians were displaced when they fled violence orchestrated 
by government forces and armed groups loyal to Kolingba. 
These armed groups stormed the presidential palace in 
Bangui in an attempt to wrest power from Patassé. Civil-
ians were killed in reprisal attacks when government forces 
loyal to Patassé killed ethnic Yakoma civilians and armed 
militias, and in retaliation those loyal to Kolingba killed 
ethnic Sara (UNHCR 2001b). Chaos ensued with civilians, 
ex-government forces, and armed militias fleeing to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR 2002f, 2001g, 
2002a, 2002c). In this chaos, armed groups often moved 
with civilians, concealing their weapons to pose as refu-
gees. Approximately 1,250 armed fighters posed as civilians 
in refugee camps. They often fuelled tensions between dif-
ferent ethnic groups fleeing from the same areas and viol-
ence, who had by then become hostile toward each other. 
(UNHCR 2001a, 2001d, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a). Commu-
nities that had previously coexisted became hostile 
towards, and suspicious of, members of ethnic groups out-
side of their own (Broch-Due 2005, 25; UNHCR 2005g, 
2013e).
In 2002 government air strikes raised ethnic tensions 
amongst civilians. A civil war ensued when Bozizé, in his 
attempt to secure the presidency, launched an attack 
against his former ally Patassé (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2012).7 In this conflict, Patassé relied on his own ethnic 
group of northern Sara-Kaba (also found in southern 
Chad), and also sought support from transnational militia. 
The latter had a Ugandan background, and were located in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and headed by 
Jeane-Pierre Bemba – the Mouvement de Liberation du 
Congo (MLC). On the other hand, Bozizé, from the Gbaya 
ethnic group, had military support from Chad and the 
Banyamulenge militia from the DRC. Both Patassé and 
Bozizé used state resources and armed groups, and rein-
forced notions of stable and unchanging ethnic ties 
amongst the population.
The second trajectory of violence began with Bozizé seiz-
ing power in a coup in 2003. In this period continuous 
fighting between militias and government forces included 
the targeting of civilians. In the same year conflict erupted 
between the armed groups led by Bozizé and those led by 
Michél Djotodia, who was the leader of the Forcés Démo-
cratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) and would later 
hold the presidency from 2013 to 2014.8 President-in-exile 
Patassé and former general Kolingba’s supporters merged 
their militias to oppose Bozizé’s regime. The change in 
political leadership resulted in a change of ethnic domi-
nance, for both the government and its civil servants, and 
triggered a change of militia alliances. Members of the 
military, the Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA), who 
were members of the Yakoma ethnic group, revolted 
against Bozizé (UNHCR 2001a, 2001b, 2003c, 2005a)
Several ceasefires and peace agreements failed to reduce 
the fighting as politically interested militia groups and 
including the military FACA proposed political appoint-
ments from within their own ranks. This represents the 
third path of violence, when internal displacement as a 
result of various internal conflicts reached critical levels in 
the period 2005 to 2006. The regular armed forces FACA 
6 Kolingba was self-appointed president from 
1981–1993 followed by elected Patassé 1993–2003.
7 François Bozizé participated as an officer along-
side Patassé in a coup to overthrow Kolingba. He 
conducted a coup against his ally Patassé in 2003, 
and served as the sixth president of CAR between 
2003 and 2013.
8  Demonstrating the fluidity of these arrange-
ments, the UFDR coalition in 2003 comprised the 
Groupe d’action Patriotique pour la Liberation de 
Centrafrique (GAPLC), Convention des Patriots 
pour la Justice et la paix (CPJP), Mouvement des 
Libérateurs Centrafricaines pour la Justice (MLCJ), 
Armée pour la Restauration de la République et al 
Démocratie (APRD), and the Front Démocratique 
Centafricain (FDC).
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were accused of orchestrating mass violence against vil-
lagers, equalling, if not surpassing the atrocities of the mil-
itias. Like many armies elsewhere in Africa FACA is 
understaffed, poorly trained, ill-disciplined, and ill-pre-
pared to confront rebel movements and militias. Fur-
thermore their erratic behaviour was, and continues to be, 
compounded by the Presidential Guard, also drawn from 
the membership of FACA, that acts outside of military 
command structures as a security force of its own and 
commits atrocities against civilians.
In 2005 increased fighting in the northernmost part of the 
country forced 6,000 refugees into Cameroon and 27,800 
into Chad (UNHCR 2006a, 2006c, 2006f, 2007a, 2014a). In 
September 2005 the town of Markounda in Ouham pre-
fecture was attacked by militias, forcing the inhabitants to 
flee across the border. In 2005 violence erupted between 
the Armée pour la Restauration de la République et al 
Démocratie (APRD) and other militia groups in the 
northwest; in 2006 the Forcés Démocratiques pour le 
Rassemblement (UFDR) led a rebellion in the northeast 
(Vinck and Pham 2010, 7–10). In October 2006 and March 
2007 the UFDR attacked Barao in Vakaga prefecture, 
resulting in the mass exodus of the entire town. More than 
seven hundred homes were razed; all food supplies and 
farming stocks were destroyed. In June 2007 villagers fled 
from the north to northwest CAR as a result of fighting 
between government forces and militias where houses 
were looted and burned. The United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) estimated 
that 212,000 civilians from the north were forcibly dis-
placed in the eighteen months after December 2005. It was 
common for houses and crops to be razed; all along the 
Ouham-Pendé to the Vakaga prefectures. Few IDPs 
returned to their homes (UNHCR 2010d, 2011, 2013c, 
2013d, 2013e, 2013f). Facing a lack of security and 
increased food shortages and fearing a return of militias to 
the region, many IDPs moved to the intensely contested 
northern areas of Bangui.9
The fourth trajectory of violence relates to the history of 
flight, security, and shelter of CAR (Martin 1998, 18). It is 
further compounded by refugees from neighbouring coun-
tries fleeing violence and famine in Sudan and Chad 
(Buijtenhuis 1998, 35). In 2010 herdsmen and militias 
clashed in Ouham prefecture, resulting in 1,500 IDPs and 
the destruction of thirteen villages (UNHCR 2010a) and in 
2011 the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a militia that oper-
ates across the state borders of Uganda, the DRC, and Sudan, 
continued to attack, murder, and kidnap villagers in the CAR 
(UNHCR 2010b, 2012b, 2014b, 2014c). In 2011 the United 
Nations observed militias, international groups, and bandits 
involved in criminality in the east and northeast of the CAR 
(UNHCR 2014a, 2014d), and the area experienced inter-
community and inter-group/ethnic violence. The conflict 
here largely involved the UDFR and the CPJP in the Vakaga, 
Haute-Kotto, and Bamingui-Bangoran prefectures bordering 
Chad and Sudan, where militias share the same religion but 
are of different, and often opposing, ethnic identities. Con-
flict between armed groups, displacement of civilians, and 
levels of violence raised ethnic tensions and brought the 
northern-southern divide to the fore. This trajectory cul-
minated in the successful coup by Djotodia in 2012.
5.2. Leadership Changes and Political Power
The greater the violence perpetrated by militias, the greater 
the opportunity to enter negotiations with those who con-
trol central power structures. This is the rationale and cal-
culation of militias, which underlies their dual purpose. In 
CAR the recruitment and formation of militias follows two 
patterns. Firstly, self-defence units are established to protect 
villages and communities from the bandits – zaraguinas. 
Secondly, when these units are absorbed into militias many 
of the young recruits are often motivated by poverty, depri-
vation, exclusion, and fear. For them the militias represent 
opportunity and security.
Many residents in Bangui have long been a target for 
marauding groups of youths who terrorise residents and 
9 The failure of the 2007 and 2008 peace agree-
ments was attributed to Bozizé reneging on prom-
ises made to militias like the UFDR to integrate their 
fighters into the state army; this was one of the goals 
and expected rewards of many militia members as it 
remains one of the few stable employment oppor-
tunities in the country.
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target foreigners (UNHCR 2003a, 2003d, 2005f, 2013e). 
Looting and vandalism are widespread, along with 
murders, assaults, rapes, and kidnappings. Without a respite 
from violence, the communities experience – and possibly 
themselves perpetrate – extensive and continuous property 
and violent crime.
Integration of refugees and IDPs into existing CAR com-
munities remains problematic. By 2009, all the participat-
ing militias had reneged on the 2008 peace treaty, and the 
Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricaines pour la Justice 
(MLCJ) launched an attack against villages and state 
troops. Clashes between militias such as the UFDR and the 
CPJP transformed into conflicts between communities, 
resulting in widespread displacement in the Haute-Kotto 
prefecture. Villagers claimed that violence was retaliatory; 
militias would attack towns in the northern prefectures and 
government forces would then (re)capture the towns by 
performing sweeps (UNHCR 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b; 
Caux 2007; UNHCR 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e; 
Vinck and Pham 2010, 17). In this environment of a com-
plete lack of security and mounting fear, villages were 
abandoned, economic activity ceased, and unemployment 
was widespread (UNHCR 2010c, 2013a, 2013b). Many fled 
into the forests and only returned to the villages sporadi-
cally during the day. Not only did villagers fear armed 
groups but they also feared, and were suspicious of, other 
communities of different ethnic and religious affiliations. 
The conflict led to hostilities in various neighbourhoods of 
the city of Bangui. Unlike the rural areas where commu-
nities formed loosely collective units of varying religious 
and ethnic identities, Bangui is comprised of neigh-
bourhood kudros. The kudros are fragments of the rural 
kinship structure transferred to the city and thus create 
ethnically stratified neighbourhoods (see Adrien-Rongier 
1981 for a detailed explanation of the Kudros). As self-con-
tained units there is limited interaction between members 
from other kudros so ethnic, regional and religious iden-
tities become fixed.
5.3. 2013: The Séléka, Ex-Séléka and Anti-Balaka Militias
In wresting power from Bozizé in March 2013, Michel Djo-
todia, an ethnic Gula, was identified in media reports as the 
first Muslim leader of the CAR. As with preceding presi-
dents, Djotodia usurped political power through the mil-
itias loyal to him. By incorporating loosely organised 
armed groups with poor resources into the coalition, Djo-
todia attempted to include various members of the Séléka 
into the state institutions, particularly the military and civil 
service bureaucracy, thus rewarding them with employ-
ment and security. This practice was meant to secure and 
continue armed support for the political leadership. How-
ever, an inability to please all members, and particularly the 
various leaders within the coalition, soon led to frag-
mentation and division.
The Séléka recruited militias from Sudan and Chad, as 
groups moved across borders seeking new coalitions and 
economic opportunities. As neither the Séléka nor the anti-
Balaka are coalitions based on religion, any religious 
dimension to the conflict is overshadowed by the trajectory 
of pre-existing conflicts. Religious affiliation was irrelevant 
to the militias as they targeted civilians in an attempt to 
deprive other militias of resources, particularly food, medi-
cines, and potential recruits. The Séléka set the precedent 
by moving beyond their original prefectures in the north, 
targeting the southern areas and Djotodia’s political base. 
Djotodia’s very short presidency introduced the Gula, with 
ethnic links in Chad, to political power and institutional 
access. The Séléka was, and remains, a heterogeneous 
opportunistic militia, opposed to the Gbaya communities 
from which Bozizé hails. It is not religion that is the salient 
linkage here, but trajectories of political power and ensuing 
conflicts.
The authority of the warlord does not translate into univer-
sal loyalty. As he attempted to disband the Séléka and bring 
the fighters under his control, Djotodia’s influence and 
authority over the coalition faltered. Disintegrating into 
factions so quickly and easily implies that the group lacked 
a bond beyond material interests, or a shared grievance; in 
particular shared ethnic or religious values were missing. 
The new factions (splinter groups) became known in the 
media as the ex-Séléka. This chaotic period allowed Bozizé, 
while in exile, to recall the Front pour le Retour de l’ordre 
Constitutionnel en Centrafrique (FROCCA) to support the 
anti-Balaka militia (International Crisis Group 2013) as a 
manoeuvre to oust Djotodia from political office.
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By invoking religious identity Bozizé’s actions created a 
new dividing line in the conflict, now mainly based on 
religious rather than ethnic and regional identity. He thus 
altered the nature of the conflict, preventing any future 
Muslim candidates, who often come from the northern 
prefectures of Vakaga or Ouham, from seeking political 
office.
5.4. Militias and the Lack of Ideology
In CAR militias are usually composed of particular ethnic 
groups due to their recruitment strategies. Militias gen-
erally recruit in areas where they are supported and 
trusted, and as a consequence they are fundamentally 
structured around ethnic identity (Fjelde and Hultman 
2014). For example the Armée pour la Restauration de la 
République et al Démocratie (APRD), which emerged in 
2005, is composed of members of the Sara-Kaba ethnicity 
including former ex-Presidential Guards from the Patassé 
regime. The Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rass-
emblement (UFDR) and the Front Démocratique du 
Peuple Centrafrique (FDPC), formed in 2006, feature pre-
dominantly Muslim Gula. These groups operate in the 
Vakaga and Haute Kotto prefectures. The Convention des 
Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP) are Arabic-
speaking Runga from the Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture. 
These militias work together or against each other depend-
ing on the changing interests, power and coalition arrange-
ments of their leaders. There are tensions based on 
ethnicity between various militia groups in neighbouring 
prefectures of the CAR. Thus the UFDR and the FDPC are 
antagonistic toward ethnic Kara, and the CPJP toward the 
ethnic Gula (IRIN 2009). Yet these three groups, all orig-
inating from the northeastern prefectures, were nonethe-
less united in the Séléka coalition.
Political leadership in the CAR has used militias as tools to 
support and maintain the legitimacy of political leaders. 
The population provides support, in the form of new 
recruits and logistics, for militias such as the anti-Balaka. 
To date militias have had little focus on or interest in 
national or regional issues (Rubin 2006, 12). Utilising mobs 
that identify themselves in terms of a particular religious 
identity is a new element to the trajectories of violence in 
CAR.
6. Conclusion
The trajectories of violent conflict in CAR are exemplary of 
an extremely violent society as conceptualised by Gerlach 
(2010). Most CAR citizens are affected by the violence in 
their country, and the tensions and conflicts created by the 
regular army, militias, and armed bandit groups. As agree-
ments between armed groups are temporary, there is no 
specific targeted group of victims, and these groups change 
from region to region and across time; all civilians are fair 
game for armed groups from all sides. Changes in alliances 
result in different groups becoming victimised, indepen-
dent of ethnicity and religion of victim and perpetrator 
groups. Coalitions are easily entered into and dismantled, 
with little or no ideological, ethnic or religious rationale. 
Instead these alliances are fuelled by self-interest, self-
preservation, and material gain. Nonetheless, the pervasive 
violence raises suspicions and uncertainty between ethnic 
groups and communities, and also promotes ethnic con-
flicts, which then are used by political and military leaders. 
Further to this, internal conflicts in CAR are shaped by 
ongoing conflicts in the neighbouring DRC, Sudan, South 
Sudan, and Chad, as well as regional conflicts in Nigeria, 
Mali, Uganda, and Cameroon. The current violence, which 
is portrayed as a religious confrontation between Muslims 
and Christians has its roots in the 2003 conflict between 
Bozizé and Djotodia, and their access to competing militias 
and the regular armed forces. The empirical material used 
here demonstrates that the use of militias and rebel armies 
was a practice of influential individuals to gain power, 
political as well as economic, to stabilise their authority and 
to increase their military strength as a power base. Attacks 
on what each militia perceived to be the locus of support 
for a rival group – communities, villages, or ethnic groups – 
were attempts to deprive the other group of resources, 
recruits, and political support.
When alliances were formed these new coalitions com-
prised ex-soldiers, unemployed youth, aggrieved peasants, 
and professional soldiers. These coalitions exhibit different 
aims, different enemies, different agendas, and the support 
of different leaders. The complexity of the conflict is due 
to the fact that the aims are temporary, as are the coali-
tions, and today’s brothers in arms become tomorrow’s 
enemies.
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The formal military has a dual role in the violence. It seeks 
to eliminate political opposition to the state, and therefore 
particular leaders, but many within the ranks seek personal 
and material gains; militias join in this enterprise accord-
ing to their own allegiances and interests. Both then con-
tribute to the devastation of villages and communities, and 
heighten discord and fear amongst the population. The 
violence usually begins with actions by the legitimate 
armed forces and militias and then trickles down to com-
munities where it becomes widespread and often per-
sonally motivated (see Kalyvas 2006, 111–45). When 
conflict and strife mount within and between commu-
nities, this is often done with the tacit consent, cooperation 
or even instigation of armed groups. The rationale for the 
violence differs, though. Communities claim their violence 
is defensive and pre-empts attacks from potential enemies. 
More recently, communities have claimed to be defending 
religious identity.
However, Muslims and Christians are neither represented 
by the militias (Séléka and anti-Balaka respectively), nor do 
Muslim and Christian communities support them. The 
anti-Balaka movement as it presently exists in the CAR is 
not the community-based response initiatives against other 
militias such as the Séléka. Like the Séléka, the anti-Balaka 
itself is a militia, composed of various factions of ethnic 
and other origin. Like the other militias, it fights for politi-
cal access and material gain hiding behind the façade of 
self-defence and self-preservation.
The latest round of violence in CAR is different in that the 
scale of the operations has grown, and more individuals 
seek access to political power (Waugh 2014). The fighting 
and looting escalated beyond villages, infiltrating the 
rigidly ethnically defined neighbourhoods of Bangui, 
including the PK-12 kudros that is home to refugees fleeing 
disputes in neighbouring prefectures and states.10 Cur-
rently, it appears that the violence is between villages and 
neighbourhoods in Bangui, and the role played by militias 
has faded. The violence has morphed into private and per-
sonal grievances between individuals and communities. 
Differences between community members, however slight, 
led to conflict as identity boundaries shifted. Portrayals of 
these communities living together peacefully are not com-
pletely true as they have always been segregated by ethnic, 
religious, and social differences; like other groups in CAR, 
underlying tensions and suspicions made them vulnerable 
to manipulation by interest groups. What is currently 
termed a “religious” conflict is just another trajectory of 
violence in the extremely violent society of CAR.
10 PK-12 is a kudros in Bangui inhabited by dis-
placed persons, particularly refugees. Unlike the 
other kudros that are established in terms of kinship 
structures and ethnic affiliations (and are in fact 
replicas of the social hierarchy and structures in the 
villages), PK-12 is a refuge for groups and individ-
uals that have no place to go.
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